The course is a primer in game theory that aims to introduce students to the language and methods used to analyze static and dynamic games of complete and incomplete information. Special emphasis is posed on economic applications. Among the others, the course deals with problems concerning business strategies such as those related to the determination of sale prices and production/distribution, strategies related to firm entry/exit and market positioning, bargaining, auction strategies and mechanisms, optimal policy, issues related to agents’ credibility and to the time-consistence/sustainability of their decisions.
Curriculum
scheda docente
materiale didattico
1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Mutuazione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 R TIRELLI MARIO
Programma
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Testi Adottati
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Modalità Erogazione
Class lectures, also with weakly discussions of problems and applications.Modalità Frequenza
Three weakly lectures during the academic semesterModalità Valutazione
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books.
scheda docente
materiale didattico
1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Mutuazione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 R TIRELLI MARIO
Programma
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Testi Adottati
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Modalità Erogazione
Class lectures, also with weakly discussions of problems and applications.Modalità Frequenza
Three weakly lectures during the academic semesterModalità Valutazione
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books.
scheda docente
materiale didattico
1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Mutuazione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 R TIRELLI MARIO
Programma
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Testi Adottati
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Modalità Erogazione
Class lectures, also with weakly discussions of problems and applications.Modalità Frequenza
Three weakly lectures during the academic semesterModalità Valutazione
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books.
scheda docente
materiale didattico
1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Mutuazione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 R TIRELLI MARIO
Programma
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Testi Adottati
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Modalità Erogazione
Class lectures, also with weakly discussions of problems and applications.Modalità Frequenza
Three weakly lectures during the academic semesterModalità Valutazione
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books.
scheda docente
materiale didattico
1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Mutuazione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 R TIRELLI MARIO
Programma
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Testi Adottati
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Modalità Erogazione
Class lectures, also with weakly discussions of problems and applications.Modalità Frequenza
Three weakly lectures during the academic semesterModalità Valutazione
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books.
scheda docente
materiale didattico
1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Mutuazione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 R TIRELLI MARIO
Programma
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Testi Adottati
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Modalità Erogazione
Class lectures, also with weakly discussions of problems and applications.Modalità Frequenza
Three weakly lectures during the academic semesterModalità Valutazione
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books.
scheda docente
materiale didattico
1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Mutuazione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 R TIRELLI MARIO
Programma
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Testi Adottati
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Modalità Erogazione
Class lectures, also with weakly discussions of problems and applications.Modalità Frequenza
Three weakly lectures during the academic semesterModalità Valutazione
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books.
scheda docente
materiale didattico
1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Mutuazione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 R TIRELLI MARIO
Programma
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Testi Adottati
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Modalità Erogazione
Class lectures, also with weakly discussions of problems and applications.Modalità Frequenza
Three weakly lectures during the academic semesterModalità Valutazione
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books.
scheda docente
materiale didattico
1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Mutuazione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 R TIRELLI MARIO
Programma
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Testi Adottati
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Modalità Erogazione
Class lectures, also with weakly discussions of problems and applications.Modalità Frequenza
Three weakly lectures during the academic semesterModalità Valutazione
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books.
scheda docente
materiale didattico
1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Mutuazione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 R TIRELLI MARIO
Programma
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Testi Adottati
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Modalità Erogazione
Class lectures, also with weakly discussions of problems and applications.Modalità Frequenza
Three weakly lectures during the academic semesterModalità Valutazione
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books.
scheda docente
materiale didattico
1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Mutuazione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 R TIRELLI MARIO
Programma
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Testi Adottati
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Modalità Erogazione
Class lectures, also with weakly discussions of problems and applications.Modalità Frequenza
Three weakly lectures during the academic semesterModalità Valutazione
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books.
scheda docente
materiale didattico
1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Mutuazione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 R TIRELLI MARIO
Programma
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Testi Adottati
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Modalità Erogazione
Class lectures, also with weakly discussions of problems and applications.Modalità Frequenza
Three weakly lectures during the academic semesterModalità Valutazione
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books.